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CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY,
INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS
AND CHANGING CORPORATE BEHAVIOR IN
THE GLOBAL WORKPLACE
Owen E. Herrnstadt

INTRODUCTION
International labor groups seek innovative ways to change corporate
behavior toward social responsibility. One method used to achieve this
objective is negotiated international framework agreements (IFAs), also
referred to as global framework agreements, between organizations
represented by labor unions and multi-national corporations. To date,
nearly eighty of these agreements have been executed, roughly thirty of
them in the past five years.1 This article elaborates on my previous research
regarding why framework agreements are negotiated and the elements that
must be incorporated for them to be successful.2 It also reviews two
negotiated agreements and subsequent challenges that resulted from union



Mr. Herrnstadt is the Director of Trade and Globalization for the International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers. He also teaches international labor
and employment law and U.S. employment law as an Adjunct Professor at the
American University Washington College of Law and the Georgetown University Law
Center.
1
See generally Framework Agreements, GLOBAL COUNCIL OF UNIONS (last visited
Mar. 13, 2013) http://www.global-unions.org/framework-agreements (providing a list
of international framework agreements organized by global union federation and by
company). International agreements can take other forms, such as the Joint
Memorandum of Understanding on Fire and Building Safety for clothing suppliers in
Bangladesh; http://www.workersrights.org/linkeddocs/Bangladesh%20Fire%20and%
20Building%20Safety%20MOU-%20Nov%202012.pdf.
2
See Part I (explaining how IFAs have proven to be more effective than codes of
conduct) and Part II (arguing that IFAs require certain elements in order to be
successful); see also Owen E. Herrnstadt, Voluntary Corporate Codes of Conduct:
What is Missing?, 16 LAB. LAW. 349 (2001) [hereinafter Voluntary Codes]; Owen E.
Herrnstadt, Are International Framework Agreements A Path To Corporate Social
Responsibility ?, 10 U. Pa. J. Bus. & Emp. L. 187 (2007) [hereinafter referred to as
Path].
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organizing efforts.3
I. WHY INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS?
Today corporate social responsibility programs constitute a multi-billion
dollar a year industry. Many of these programs have been created, shaped,
and implemented by outside consultants and specialists. Entire corporate
departments also are devoted to developing and implementing social
responsibility programs. Frequently, these corporate social responsibility
programs are reflected in codes of conduct that include standards relating to
business ethics, environmental concerns, and employee relations.
While the purpose in establishing unilaterally implemented corporate
social responsibility programs vary, they are often the result of efforts to
repair a company’s tarnished public image. For example, Nike and a
number of other companies have been targets of negative consumer
campaigns after incidents involving the mistreatment of workers were
reported.4 These companies found themselves embarrassed and faced
boycott threats. Codes of conduct presented a solution for responding to
critics and avoiding future problems.
Corporate codes of conduct, however, do not placate all groups. Many
have been heavily criticized by organized labor. These critics argue that
corporate codes of conduct are public relations efforts more intended to
placate “conscience-laden consumers” than they are to actually change
corporate behavior with respect to workers’ rights—a key area of corporate
social responsibility.5
Codes of conduct often are criticized because they are unilaterally
developed, implemented, and enforced by companies with no input or
participation by the workers they are intended to help.6 In addition, codes
are criticized because many do not specify which workers they apply to or
how they will be implemented and enforced. Others contain only
ambiguous content.7 Without these essential elements, critics argue that
codes lack legitimacy with workers and have little possibility of success in
changing corporate behavior when it comes to honoring international labor
standards, a true benchmark for measuring corporate social responsibility.

3

See infra Part III (critically examining the Siemens International Framework
Agreement and its effectiveness in a labor challenge that arose involving the company)
and Part IV(critically examining IKEAs International Framework Agreement and its
role during a union organizing campaign).
4
Steven Greenhouse, Nike Shoe Plant in Vietnam is Called Unsafe, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 8, 1987, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/11/08/business/nike-shoeplant-in-vietnam-is-called-unsafe-for-workers.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
5
Path, supra note 2, at 188; see also Voluntary Codes, supra note 2, at 350.
6
Voluntary Codes, supra note 2, at 187-188.
7
Id.
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One response to the criticisms of unilaterally implemented codes has
been the development of IFAs. These agreements attempt to address two
different but related goals. First, they are a response to non-negotiated,
unilateral codes of conduct that do not reflect workers’ input, and are
inherently unable to advance the goal of corporate social responsibility.
Second, they are a response to the shortcomings of national labor and
employment laws with respect to fundamental human rights.8 Global
framework agreements differ from corporate codes of conduct because,
“they are a product of negotiations between organized labor and the
company.”9 They include the workers’ perspectives and “attempt to remedy
the content and procedural deficiencies associated with [unilaterally
implemented] codes.”10
Negotiating a framework agreement between a global company and
workers across the globe is not an easy task. It takes a powerful union in
the home country of the corporation that has a good relationship with the
multi-national corporation. It also takes a global network of unions that
represent workers for the corporation in different parts of the world. Of
course, negotiating an IFA also takes corporations that are willing to
discuss these matters with labor organizations. With few exceptions, this
means corporations who are experienced in engaging in social dialogue
with unions. As a consequence, most IFAs have been negotiated between
European-based multi-national corporations and European unions and
works councils.11 The fact that most IFAs are European-based is not
surprising:
First, European experience fosters a culture of dialogue. After
all, the move toward works councils, supervisory boards, codedetermination, and so forth is predicated on a basis of “dialogue”
as opposed to one of an adversarial nature. It seems only natural
then, that discussion over new mechanisms for achieving corporate
social responsibility would emanate from this type of industrial
relations system. Second, in contrast, in the United States there is
no basis for social dialogue. Indeed, under the structure of the U.S.
labor law, IFA’s may not, in general, be considered to constitute a
mandatory subject for bargaining, and therefore, it is difficult to
“compel” a company to negotiate them. Third, in the United States,
many employers are opening hostile to unions; and, for the most
part, the legal institution of social dialogue does not exist. And,
8

Id.
Id. at 188.
10
Id.
11
See Framework Agreements, supra note 1. While a small number of nonEuropean companies do have IFAs, many of them carry the same weaknesses of
European IFAs.
9
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fourth, U.S. workers and their unions do not share certain
protections enjoyed by many of their European counterparts
concerning health care, retirement security, job security, and
benefits. These kinds of issues presumably take priority for many
U.S. workers over IFAs, in discussions with an employer.12

II. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A SUCCESSFUL IFA
In order to be fully effective, IFAs must adequately incorporate four
fundamental elements: content (including standards), coverage,
implementation and enforcement.13
A. Content
Content is the most complicated of the essential elements. It is
absolutely critical IFAs contain clear, and comprehensive labor standards
that will apply anywhere in the world that the company operates. Not just
any definition of these standards will do. These standards should be
consistent with those developed by the International Labor Organization
(“ILO”), an agency of the United Nations. The ILO is, perhaps, the most
credible international organization when it comes to defining
internationally-recognized labor standards for two reasons. First, the
highest body of the ILO Conference is tripartite in nature, composed of
equal numbers of employer, labor, and governmental representatives.14
Second, it takes two-thirds of the ILO governing body, the International
Conference, to adopt a standard known as a convention.15 ILO standards
also are accompanied by jurisprudence and interpretations furnished
through a committee structure that includes the Freedom of Association
Committee, the Committee of Experts, and the Committee on Applications
and Standards.16 ILO conventions are uniquely qualified to serve as
12

Id. at 191.
Id. at 192-207.
14
Constitution of the International Labour Organization, 62 Stat. 3485, 15 U.N.T.S.
35, art. 7 [hereinafter “ILO Constitution”] (stating that the fifty-six members of the
Governing body consists of twenty-eight representatives of governments, fourteen
representatives of employers, and fourteen representatives of employees).
15
Id. at art. 19(2).
16
Committee on Freedom of Association, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/
applying-and-promoting-international-labour-standards/committee-on-freedom-ofassociation/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2013); Committee of Experts on
the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/
global/standards/applying-and-promoting-international-labour-standards/committee-ofexperts-on-the-application-of-conventions-and-recommendations/lang--en/index.htm
(last visited Mar. 13, 2013); Conference Committee on Applications and Standards,
13
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international labor standards, given the vigorous process for developing,
adopting, and interpreting them.
To date, 189 conventions have been ratified by the ILO. Eight of these
conventions are referred to as core labor standards.17 They include
prohibitions on forced labor, discrimination, and child labor, as well as
freedom of association and collective bargaining. It is absolutely essential
that the content of an IFA includes these core standards and explicitly
reference the relevant ILO conventions and accompanying jurisprudence
such as decisions and comments made by the ILO Committee on Freedom
of Association. Specific references to the ILO’s core labor standards are
key to ensuring that labor standards in the IFA are not vague, ambiguous,
or subject to different interpretations and that they can be implemented
consistently without misunderstandings.
The content of an IFA must be uniform wherever the company operates.
Some companies would like to apply IFAs on a “sliding scale” for
operations in countries like China where internationally recognized core
labor standards do not exist. This kind of disparate application of the
content of an IFA must be resisted, “[A]fter all, how can a corporation
claim that it is honoring international labor standards when its IFA cannot
be applied to one of the world’s largest and fastest growing economies?”18
Notably, in other countries like the United States, which have not ratified
the ILO Conventions concerning freedom of association and collective
bargaining, national law falls short of meeting internationally recognized
labor standards.19 In particular, the lawful use of permanent striker
replacements during a labor dispute, prohibitions against secondary

ILO, http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/applying-and-promoting-international-labourstandards/conference-committee-on-the-application-of-standards/lang--en/index.htm
(last visited Mar. 13, 2013).
17
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948,
July 9, 1948, ILOLEX No. C87, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgilex/convde.pl?C087; Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949,
July 1, 1949, ILOLEX No. C98, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgilex/convde.pl?C098; the Forced Labour Convention, 1930, June 28, 1930, ILOLEX
No. C29, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C029; the Abolition
of Forced Labour Convention, 1957, June 25, 1957, ILOLEX No. C105, available at
http:// www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C105; the Equal Remuneration
Convention, 1951, June 29, 1951, ILOLEX No. C100, available at http://
www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C100; the Discrimination (Employment and
Occupation) Convention, 1958, June 25, 1958, ILOLEX No. C111, available at
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C111; the Minimum Age Convention,
1973, June 26, 1973, ILOLEX No. C138, available at http:// www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgilex/convde.pl?C138; and the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999, June 17,
1999, ILOLEX No. C182, available at http:// www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgilex/convde.pl?C182.
18
Path, supra note 2, at 198.
19
Id.
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activities, and other limitations on the right to strike raise serious questions
regarding U.S. compliance with the freedom of association and the right to
collective bargaining.20 IFAs that carve out countries like the United States,
which do not comply with ILO standards, present doubts about the IFA’s
commitment to changing corporate behavior.21 Workers throughout the
world, whether they work in the United States, China, South Africa,
Colombia, or anywhere else, deserve the full application and enforcement
of fundamental human rights, regardless of national labor law.
Thus, it is entirely inadequate for an IFA to merely obligate its
signatories to national or local laws, as it exemplifies the problems of the
sliding scale approach. “This is a fundamental issue that distinguishes IFAs
from codes of conduct, and for labor groups goes to the core of an IFAs
credibility. It makes little sense from a labor group’s perspective to
negotiate an agreement with a company that sets forth standards that it is
already required to honor through national law. Such an IFA would be
tantamount to negotiating an agreement that obligates a corporation to obey
already-existing laws.”22
B. Coverage
In addition to incorporating clear international labor standards, it is
critical that IFAs contain effective coverage provisions. They must be
broad enough to “cover the entire enterprise, including subsidiaries,
suppliers, and joint ventures.”23 Coverage must be broad to ensure the
integrity of the agreement as global supply chains continue to expand.
Broad coverage is also necessary to ensure that the increased use of
contract work and other forms of domestic outsourcing do not allow
corporations to escape the commitments that they have made under the
agreement. An IFAs failure to cover all employees raises serious issues:
“It is not difficult to imagine the skepticism of an outsourced
employee (as well as the general public) who is not covered by an
IFA, particularly when working alongside an employee of the
company who is covered by the IFA. Such a situation is untenable
and its mere possibility raises serious questions regarding the
integrity of the IFA.”24

20

See LANCE COMPA, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN
THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS (2004)
(providing a new edition of the 2000 Human Rights Watch report).
21
Path, supra note 2, at 198.
22
Id. at 197.
23
Id. at192.
24
Id.
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C. Implementation
Even if an IFA has significantly broad coverage and detailed content that
explicitly contains the ILO’s core labor standards it will not be effective if
it is not implemented in a meaningful way.25 Meaningful implementation of
an IFA requires both communication and educational activities.26 With
respect to communication, IFAs must be written in a manner that can be
understood by the average worker—regardless of the country that the
corporation or its suppliers operates. Educational activities are also key to
effective implementation of IFAs. Many of the concepts regarding
fundamental human rights, like the freedom and of association and
collective bargaining or discrimination are complicated concepts which
require a basic understanding. All levels of management, workers, and
suppliers must receive training to understand these standards and,
specifically, the many ways in which they apply in the workplace.
D. Enforcement
If an IFA is not enforced, it will have little relevance to workers it
intends to protect. This means that enforcement must provide a deterrent
and, when necessary, provide remedies that will have an impact on how the
corporation proceeds with respecting the agreed to terms of the IFA.27 It is
critical that a dispute resolution mechanism also be provided when a
complaint that the IFA remains unresolved. Binding arbitration and other
forms of effective dispute resolution are essential to ensure the integrity of
the process.
In order for enforcement to work it must be transparent. Monitoring is a
critical tool for ensuring transparency.28 For monitoring to be effective, it
must utilize independent monitors such as trade unions and other NGOs
who have familiarity with labor relations.29 It is also necessary that the
monitoring process receive adequate resources so that it can be
accomplished in an effective manner. In the spirit of transparency, the
procedures for monitoring should also be agreed to and publicized making
certain that employees and or their representatives know how to file claims
and will be guaranteed an independent response to their complaints in a
timely fashion.

25

Id. at 201-202.
Id.
27
Id. at 202-203.
28
Id.
29
Id.
26
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INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT BETWEEN
SIEMENS AG THE CENTRAL WORKS COUNCIL OF SIEMENS AG,
THE IG METALL AND THE INDUSTRIALL GLOBAL UNION

On July 25, 2012, the Central Works Council of Siemens AG, IG Metall
(the German metalworkers union) and IndustriALL Global Union entered
into an international framework agreement with Siemens AG.30 The
agreement is typical of many IFAs. It addresses matters related to content,
coverage, and implementation. It also provides for a process when
allegations have been made by one of the signatories that the IFA has been
violated. Like many IFAs, although the Siemens IFA references these
matters, it falls short of meeting the essential elements previously
discussed. Among other things, it fails to clearly adopt the ILO convention
concerning the freedom of association and does not contain a binding
dispute resolution mechanism. These failings presented serious challenges
during a union organizing drive at one of its U.S. facilities.
The preamble to the Seimens IFA states:
With this background Siemens accordingly accepts the social
responsibility principles referred to and explicitly acknowledges
the fundamental employee rights defined in the relevant
international conventions, the fundamental conventions of the
International Labour Organization (ILO) . . . [including] freedom
of association and collective bargaining . . . . The international
dialogue has to respect and balance both the local legal
requirements and processes of every jurisdiction as well as the
diversity and global presence of Siemens . . . .31
Section 2.4 of the agreement entitled “Freedom of Association and the
right to collective bargaining” states:
The right of employees to form labour unions, join existing
labour unions and conduct collective negotiations is
acknowledged. Members of employee organizations or unions
will be neither advantaged nor disadvantaged on account of their
membership (see principles of ILO Conventions 87 and 98). A
constructive approach will be taken to cooperation with
employees, employee representatives and unions on the basis of
30

International Framework Agreement between Siemens AG the Central Works
Council of Siemens AG, the IG Metall and the IndustriALL Global Union, available at
http://www.industriall-union.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/siemens-gfa2012-english_final_0.pdf [hereinafter referred to as “Seimens IFA”].
31
Id. at Section 1.
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local law. Even in contentious disputes, the continuing objective
will be to maintain effective constructive cooperation and to seek
solutions with the aim of balancing our commercial interests and
the interest of our employees.
If the level of protection granted to employees in a country in
which Siemens operates fails to essentially reflect these
principles, Siemens will nevertheless apply these higher standards
to its employees.32
The Siemen's IFA references the freedom of association and collective
bargaining, but qualifies these references by stating merely that the
company “acknowledges” these rights.33 But what does acknowledging
these rights actually mean? After all, a company can acknowledge rights
and then choose to narrowly interpret and apply them or ignore them
altogether. The Siemen's IFA also states that it “accepts the social
responsibility principles” referenced in ILO conventions.34 Again, however,
it does not specify what acceptance of these principles actually commits the
company to honoring. One argument is that obligating a company to
honoring principles is not the same as honoring the conventions
themselves. For example, a company can recognize the right of its
employees to form their own union without adhering to the actual rights
reflected by the ILO’s Convention on Freedom of Association.
The Siemens agreement also states the need to respect local requirements
while requiring the company to apply higher standards to its own
employees if the company operates in a country that “fails essentially to
reflect these principles.”35 Does this mean that the Company’s operations in
countries that do not respect freedom of association and collective
bargaining will implement these fundamental human rights? Will it mean
that the Company will recognize a legitimate independent union, even if
the union is not recognized under its own national or local laws?
The Seimens IFA fails to satisfy the essential elements for an IFA by not
clearly adopting the rights reflected in actual ILO conventions and
accompanying jurisprudence. This failure left the signatories to the
agreement with different interpretations of its meaning and application.
Like other IFAs that contained similar flaws, it did not take long for a
dispute to arise under the Siemens IFA.36 An organizing drive to represent
Siemens employees at one of its sites in the United States was met with an
32

Id. at Section 2.4.
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
See e.g. Path, supra note 2, at 198-199 (describing a dispute between an
anonymous employer and union that emerged shortly after the creation of an IFA).
33
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anti-union campaign.37 In one letter sent to an employee, the Company
made its position on the union effort known:
I want to take this opportunity to emphasize that Siemens does
not believe a union is in the best interest of our employees here . . .
. The reason is two-fold: Unions haven’t delivered on their
promises and unionized employers can have difficulty being
competitive in today’s global economy. We believe our futures are
better served by working together toward a common goal, without
interference from an outside third party concerned about its own
interests. We believe we can accomplish more and we can compete
better in securing ours for . . . [this] facility if we work together,
one-on-one and in teams without unions.38
In a letter to Siemens AG, IndustriALL’s General Secretary, Jyrki Raina
listed numerous allegations indicating anti-union conduct on behalf of the
company, including threats to employees.39 He noted that the union had
filed unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board
and expressed concern that the actions by Siemens management
enumerated in the letter violated the IFA.40 Raina referenced language in
the IFA concerning the company’s acknowledgement of the rights of
employees to form labor unions, the objective of constructive cooperation
in contentious disputes, and provisions regarding the need for Siemens to
honor higher standards when it operates in a country that does not reflect
the principles of freedom of association.
Siemens’ response to IndustriAll’s allegations reaffirmed the company’s
commitment to core labor standards and basic employee rights, including
the right to bargain collectively through freely chosen representatives.41 It
denied that its actions were in violation of the IFA by maintaining that it
had not violated local labor laws by its conduct, stating, “By respecting the
legal rights of employees to choose if they wish to be represented by and/or
associated with a union and by complying with local legal requirements,
Siemens is acting both within the letter and the spirit of the IFA.”42
Is Seimen’s response denying the allegations that its actions are in
violation of the IFA the end of the complaint process? The Siemens IFA

37

See John Logan, Consultants, Lawyers, and the ‘Union Free’ Movement in the
U.S.A. Since the 1970’s, 33 INDUS. REL. J. 197-214 (2008).
38
Letter from Siemens to Siemens employees (July 24, 2012) (on file with author).
39
Letter from Jyrki Raina, General Secretary, IndustriALL Global Union, to
Siemens AG (Aug. 24, 2012) (on file with author).
40
Id.
41
Letter from Siemens AG, to Jyrki Raina, General Secretary, IndustriALL Global
Union (Aug. 29, 2012) (on file with author).
42
Id.
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provides that the resolution of grievances “should first exhaust the internal
and local/national complaint and arbitration facilities.”43 The fault with this
approach is that if national law does not meet international labor standards,
as is the case with respect to some aspects of U.S. labor law, then
exhaustion of national complaint mechanisms may not result in the
satisfaction of the terms of the IFA. In such a circumstance, the alternative
for resolution provided under the Seimens IFA lies with the Central Works
Council, which “has the task of . . . advising on suitable measures . . . .”
including “pursuing serious reports and complaints that cannot be resolved
through the local and national complaint and arbitration facilities . . . .”.44
Under the Seimens IFA, however, no provisions providing for binding
arbitration from a neutral party are included. This raises the question of
whether there is any effective recourse for signatories that claim the
company violated the IFA. What authority does the works council have to
resolve the dispute, or at the very least direct the dispute to a neutral party?
If the ultimate decision regarding the outcome of the dispute rests with the
Company, then how seriously will local management and workers take the
IFA? Without clear answers to these questions, and a final resolution of the
dispute, confidence in the IFA is greatly diminished. Moreover, instead of
creating good will through an IFA, the IFA may be the source of frustration
and resentment because it has created such high expectations.45
These are especially poignant questions and comments not only for the
Seimens IFA, but for all IFAs. They are not intended to denigrate existing
IFAs but to emphasize the importance of negotiating IFAs that are strong,
effective and that can fulfill the objective of changing corporate behavior
when it comes to respecting international labor standards.
IV.

INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT BETWEEN IKEA
AND THE BUILDING WOODWORKERS INTERNATIONAL

The Global Framework Agreement between IKEA and the Building and
Wood Workers’ International (“BWI”) was entered into in 1998, with what
was then known as the International Federation of Building and
Woodworkers, BWI’s successor. The agreement was further developed in

43

Seimens IFA, supra note 32, at Section 2.10.5.
Id.
45
See Siemens Anti-Union Campaign Bullies Workers Out of Organizing,
INDUSTRIALL UNION (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.industriall-union.org/siemens-antiunion-campaign-bullies-workers-out-of-organizing; see also, Path, supra note 2, at 205
(noting that modern communication can make the failure of an IFA even more wellknown, and therefore more pronounced).
44
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2001 and is now known as the IKEA Way on Purchasing Home Furnishing
Products.46
The agreement addresses three of the four major elements that are
required for a successful framework agreement: coverage, content and
implementation. With respect to coverage, the agreement includes
suppliers, which “must comply with national laws and regulations and with
international conventions . . . .”47 The IKEA Agreement also specifically
references labor standards. It states that the framework agreement, “is
based on eight core conventions defined” by the 1998 ILO Declaration of
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, and other human rights instruments.48 The agreement
further provides that suppliers “must comply with international conventions
concerning social and working conditions.”49 The agreement explains that
these conditions include “not preventing workers from associating freely
with any workers’ association or group of their choosing or collective
bargaining.”50
The agreement includes a provision for implementation. It states that
“suppliers shall effectively communicate to all its sub-suppliers, as well as
to its own co-workers, the content of the IKEA Way on Purchasing Home
Furnishing Products.”51 However, there does not appear to be a provision
educating local management and workers about the actual international
rights reflected by the eight ILO conventions referenced in the agreement.
The IKEA agreement, notably, does not have any provision which
addresses enforcement. Consequently, there is no recourse for the parties
when there are different interpretations of the agreement. The agreement
does contain language concerning the formation of a “global compliance
and monitoring group.”52 The language is vague, however, and does not
provide for a dispute resolution mechanism, such as arbitration.
The strength of the IKEA Way agreement was tested in 2008 by the
North American trade union, the International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers (“IAM”). In 2006, the IAM learned that
Swedwood, a subsidiary of IKEA, would be opening a manufacturing
facility in Danville, Virginia, to supply IKEA with wood products.53 The
union immediately began working with BWI and the Swedish union, GS,
which represents Swedwood workers in Sweden, for assistance in its
46

IKEA, BWI, Dec. 19, 2001, http://www.bwint.org/default.asp?Index=46&
Language=EN; IKEA Way on Purchasing Home Furnishing Products, available at
http://www.bwint.org/pdfs/iwayma.pdf.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Email from BWI to author (Oct. 30, 2006) (on file with author).
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organizing campaign. The IAM had hoped that the framework agreement
was an indication that Swedwood would be neutral during its organizing
campaign by not engaging in negative, anti-union, activities.54
Efforts were made at the earliest stages of the organizing campaign to
meet with the Company under the auspices of the agreement and to
reaffirm what BWI, GS, and the IAM understood to be the company’s
commitments regarding freedom of association, which they believed
encompassed neutrality.55 After the facility was operational, producing
wood products for IKEA, a meeting was scheduled in Danville, Virginia.
Participants were to include the IAM, the General Secretary of BWI and a
representative from the Swedish unions.56 The meeting was eventually held
under protest, without the IAM’s participation.
Throughout the campaign, calls for Swedwood to honor the framework
agreement were made by numerous union representatives in the U.S. and
abroad.57 Despite these efforts, the company conducted an anti-union
campaign, hiring a law firm “which has made its reputation keeping unions
out of companies.”58 Per-Olof Sjoo, the President of GS who visited with
Swedwood’s workers in Danville, commented: “The most consistent theme
I believe was the fear factor. Partly, people dare not openly support the
union.” Adding her thoughts on the situation at Swedwood, International
Trade Union Confederation President, Sharan Burrow, noted, “Clearly all
is not well at this factory . . . IKEA is taking advantage of the lax US
workers protection.”59
The IAM’s efforts did not rest exclusively on the strength of the
framework agreement. It received national interest in the press and media
at home and in Sweden. For example, the campaign received attention from
The Daily Show and a prominent news program in Sweden.60 Several
thousand support letters from workers all over the world were delivered to
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Swedwood’s workers prior to the election.61 The campaign proved to be a
success and the IAM easily won the NLRB election in 2011.62
Even though the framework agreement did not keep Swedwood from
engaging in an anti-union campaign, it did provide the basis for dialogue
between the Company and BWI. Through this dialogue, the IAM was able
to convey its concerns over Swedwood’s behavior to IKEA’s top level
management. Additionally, it provided a forum for representatives of BWI
and the Swedish union representing Swedwood workers to meet with the
Company in Danville. It also may have influenced Swedwood in
subsequent collective bargaining negotiations. Swedwood and the IAM
reached a collective bargaining agreement without controversy for the
Danville workers in a timely fashion.63
Outside the U.S., the IKEA framework agreement was an important
factor in the recent conclusion of a collective bargaining agreement
between nearly 9,000 workers in Poland and Swedwood.64 As Ambet
Yuson, the General Secretary of BWI commented:
The success in Poland is clearly an example of the need for
dialogue and engagement at both the national and international
level . . . . While the unions in Poland were negotiating with the
management in Poland, we were in discussions with the IKEA
management at the global level to provide the necessary support.
In the case of Poland, it was evident to s [sic] from the beginning
that IKEA wanted to have an amicable conclusion as soon as
possible. We look forward to working with IKEA to address
concerns of [workers.]”
V. CONCLUSION
IFAs can change corporate behavior in the global workplace. Their
effectiveness depends on whether the four essential elements described in
the beginning of this article are adequately included in the agreement.
When the content of agreements does not clearly incorporate international
labor standards as reflected by ILO Conventions and accompanying
jurisprudence, they are subject to different interpretations and often mired
in dispute. Likewise, if an IFA is implemented without proper training
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about the standards it imposes or if it is not distributed along with
comprehensible information in a timely fashion, covered managers and
workers may not understand the standards that are supposed to be enforced.
Additionally, if IFAs do not cover suppliers, growing global supply chains
will make them irrelevant. Lastly, if the IFA is not enforceable through a
dispute resolution mechanism, like binding arbitration, the parties’
differences will most likely remain unresolved, frustrating them and greatly
reducing the value of the IFA.
The Seimens IFA illustrates this problem. It failed to include a
binding enforcement mechanism. As a result, when differences emerged
over its interpretation, the union was left with no recourse under the IFA. It
was also left with many questions about the ability of the IFA to change the
company’s behavior towards union organizing efforts in the United States.
The IKEA IFA also comes up short due to its lack of an enforcement
mechanism. The success of the union at Swedwood (a supplier to IKEA
covered by its IFA) was built on social dialogue with IKEA management, a
global union federation (BWI), and its Swedish unions. This social
dialogue was enhanced by the IFA. The lack of enforcement was offset to
some extent by a global campaign to change the company’s behavior.
While social dialogue can be helpful, IFAs do more than provide a
mechanism for dialogue. They must provide a stand-alone, binding
commitment by a corporation to change its behavior towards the
application of international labor standards wherever it operates in the
world, including, of course, the United States. In order to do so, IFAs must
fully incorporate the essential elements previously described.

